Complex | New Iraqi Dinar

New Housing Complex to be Built in Karbala

By Nick, November 15, 2012 2:09 pm

Karbala Investment Commission has laid the cornerstone for the housing complex in the Zahra neighborhood in Hindiya district, southern Karbala.

The deputy chairman of the Commission, Ahmed al-Maliki, said the project would involve 500 housing units, an elementary school, kindergarten, nursery, markets, public parks and infrastructure services.

It will be built on a 60-acre site at a total cost of IQD 72 billion ($ 60 million).

(Source: AIN)

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Attacking the Nuclear Weapons-Industrial Complex on Both the Macro and Micro Levels

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By Nick, October 24, 2012 6:31 am

Nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation require action on two fronts: the local and policy.

It’s sometimes lost on the arms control community that halting the spread of nuclear weapons begins at home. The disarmament community, on the other hand, has long understood the importance of going local. These days, no one embodies that more than the Los Alamos Study Group. For instance, it was instrumental in letting the air out of the CMRR-NF balloon. The CMRR-NF (Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement facility) is a building that the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico seeks to construct. It’s intended to carry out design work on plutonium pits — the living, breathing heart of nuclear weapons.

Among the LASG’s efforts to halt the CMRR-NF have been sustained lobbying on Capitol Hill and two separate lawsuits that it filed against the Department of Energy on the grounds that the planned facility was environmentally and seismically un-safe. Thanks to the LASG and a sputtering economy, it’s now unlikely that the CMRR-NF will ever see the light of day.

Greg Mello, LASG‘s executive director, also frequently points out of how little benefit the nuclear-weapons labs based in New Mexico (Los Alamos and Sandia) have been to the state. In his latest newsletter he writes:

Here in New Mexico we see what appear to be desperate attempts to promote nuclear weapons, in editorials in our largest newspaper and from Senate candidates. Oddly and wrongly, weapons projects are usually linked to the state’s economic health. The reality is otherwise.

Leaving aside most of the errors on which the myth of our nuclear dependence rests, these writers and politicians fail to explain how nuclear weapons will be an engine of growth, an assumed good in their world.

… Our congressional delegation, without fail, serves the labs first. Every hour so spent, every meeting, every committee assignment so oriented, is a loss to our state. Cumulatively, in our competitive world, these losses have been very damaging to the state’s economic and social development, to our civic institutions, and to the protection of our environment.

After all, Mello asks:

How in the world will static, Soviet-style, pure federal employment, comprising two or three percent of the state’s total workers, become an engine for economic growth?

Meanwhile, at the federal level, U.S. nuclear policymakers have suffered a setback since Russia decided to opt out of the Cooperative Threat Initiative. Nunn-Lugar, as it was referred to out of deference to its creators, Senators Sam and Richard respectively, was a model federal program. Engineered in 1992, it enabled the security and dismantlement of an extraordinary number of nuclear weapons in the states of the former Soviet Union. Why then is Russia allowing it to lapse?

Russia claims that it can now afford to ride herd of its own loose nukes. Meanwhile, a New York Times editorial calls “Cutting off this successful program now is perverse and reckless — and all too typical of President Vladimir Putin’s sour, xenophobic and self-isolating worldview.” But, at Foreign Policy, Jeffrey Lewis provides more broad-based insights into Russian suspiciousness. Among them:

In recent years, American officials have been driven bonkers by Russia’s refusal to accept their assurances that missile defense interceptors deployed in Europe won’t threaten Russia’s deterrent. The United States shows PowerPoint slide after PowerPoint slide to demonstrate the physical impossibility that these interceptors could hit a Russian ICBM. The Russians remain unmollified. Frustrated U.S. officials claim the Russians either don’t understand or don’t want to.

In fact, he writes, “We may be wrong about what frightens the Russians.”

In September 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted that the Russians had expressed concern that U.S. missile defense interceptors in Europe “could be fitted with nuclear weapons and become an offensive weapon.” … (The United States and Soviet Union prohibited such missiles under the 1987 INF Treaty.) … It is a funny sort of paranoid fantasy, the notion that the United States might place nuclear weapons on missile defense interceptors and use them to decapitate the Russian leadership in Moscow.

But, writes Lewis, there may be method to their madness. In fact, they may be living in “sheer terror at the persistent technological advantage held by the United States.”

The simplest explanation for Russia’s overwhelming concern with missile defense is that the General Staff fears that Russia is much, much more vulnerable to an attack against the country’s command-and-control infrastructure — what used to be called decapitation — than we realize. … And, as a result, they make strange, dangerous, and seemingly irrational decisions.

In a follow-up post to the Foreign Policy piece at Arms Control Wonk, the leading arms-control blog that he administers, Lewis offers solutions.

How do we start talking about command and control with Russia, especially if the Russians won’t address the matter directly? I would propose that the US and Russian agree to a joint statement prohibiting the placing of nuclear weapons on missile defense interceptors. … of a ten-year duration signed by both Presidents.

This should be a relatively easy proposal for the United States to accept. [But the] Russians might be less interested. As best I can tell, the Moscow ABM defense system still relies on nuclear warheads.

But

… An agreement to prohibit nuclear-armed ABM interceptors would provide at least two benefits. First, a prohibition on nuclear-armed missile defense interceptors would provide a mechanism to address the least difficult portion of Russia’s stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons.

… Second, a prohibition on nuclear-armed missile defense interceptors would enhance strategic stability by reinforcing the prohibition on intermediate-range nuclear forces. … A ban on nuclear-armed ABM interceptors, combined with some confidence-building measures, might make the difference in preserving INF.

The LASG’s work in New Mexico (and on its behalf in Washington) and Jeffrey Lewis’s policy proscriptions are arguably the most cutting-edge approaches on, respectively, the local and the policy levels. Let’s hope that, working in secret synergy, they create anti-nuclear fusion.

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WaPo’s Dana Priest’s Alarmist Excursion Into the Nuclear Weapons-Industrial Complex

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By Nick, September 19, 2012 7:55 pm

One of the Washington Post’s star reporters has assigned herself the task of scaring up funds for “nuclear modernization.”

It was with some anticipation that I approached Dana Priest’s series in the Washington Post on nuclear-weapons modernization. After all, she’d won a Pulitzer prize and George Polk award for her reporting on CIA detention sites overseas and, along with William Arkin, she’d written Top Secret America , a three-part series on how immense the U.S. intelligence and classified activity system had become.

With the nuclear-weapons modernization articles, I was expecting an examination of the need for modernization and of nuclear weapons in general. Instead, Ms. Priest began the first article, Aging U.S. nuclear arsenal slated for costly and long-delayed modernization, by sounding an alarm about what she perceives as “the decrepit, neglected state of the aging nuclear weapons complex.” She writes that despite this ostensible state of affairs

… officials have repeatedly put off sinking huge sums into projects that receive little public recognition, driving up the costs even further.

Now, as the nation struggles to emerge from the worst recession of the postwar era and Congress faces an end-of-year deadline to avoid $ 1.2 trillion in automatic cuts to the federal budget over 10 years, the Obama administration is overseeing the gargantuan task of modernizing the nuclear arsenal to keep it safe and reliable.

… Federal officials and many outside analysts are nonetheless convinced that, after years of delay, the government must invest huge sums if it is to maintain the air, sea and land nuclear triad on which the country has relied since the start of the Cold War. Failing to act before the end of next year, they say, is likely to mean that there won’t be enough time to design and build the new systems that would be required if the old arsenal is no longer safe or reliable.

In a lengthy press release, Greg Mello, executive director of the Los Alamos Study Group, not only pointed out inaccuracies in Ms. Priest’s work, but questioned its basic assumptions. He writes:

Contrary to the impression given by this article, there is nothing about the U.S. nuclear deterrent that is about to “wear out.” The warheads and bombs in particular – the focus of this article – do not “wear out” because they undergo periodic maintenance and upgrade programs of varying intrusiveness, roughly on an as-needed basis.

The one component of the U.S. nuclear arsenal that will “wear out,” and which will do so more or less on a succession of dates certain, are nuclear submarines.

The most intrusive warhead and bomb modifications are called “life extension programs” (LEPs), which are akin to a “complete factory overhaul.” After each LEP, the warhead or bomb in question is generally expected to last another 30 years before another LEP is needed, although there may be exceptions.

As for the “the decrepit, neglected state of the aging nuclear weapons complex”:

This is grossly inaccurate and misleading. Some buildings are new, replacing others that have been torn down. Most buildings have been properly maintained and are quite serviceable as they are. A few are being intentionally neglected (“run to failure”), sometimes because replacements are planned and sometimes because of bad decisions by senior management. Across the complex, hundreds of buildings are simply not needed, or are grossly oversized for their current missions, or have been adapted for new uses – which may or may not be important. Some buildings have been the subject of major upgrades already.

Then Mello quotes the Post:

An extended stoppage would disrupt the weapons safety work and could force the closing of domestic and foreign civilian reactors that rely on low-enriched uranium from the facility, according to the NNSA.

And responds (emphasis added):

No “weapons safety work” would be interrupted. The LEP program would be interrupted, but this should not be characterized as “weapons safety work.” Nuclear weapons almost always fail toward safety, not danger. There are no weapon safety problems which the LEP program is remedying.

Finally, he addresses a spurious charge by Ms. Priest, who wrote:

For their part, many anti-nuclear activists favor disarmament by atrophy, which would mean not repairing or extending the life span of the current arsenal.

Mello:

This is absurd. We know of no anti-nuclear activists who favor disarmament by atrophy. In our own case (the Los Alamos Study Group), we believe we offer practical management alternatives which will maintain the arsenal better than NNSA’s program, which is failing, while at the same time our proposals position the country better for disarmament. We believe sound management and good government facilitate disarmament. Virtually all parties agree that NNSA is currently choosing and managing its projects poorly.

In other words, no urgent need to throw vast amounts of money at the U.S. nuclear-weapons industrial complex exists. One can only guess at Ms. Priest’s agenda for trying to scare up the funds. In the end, Mello’s critique obviates the need to even read Dana Priest’s series. With the Washington Post, it seldom pays to get one’s hopes up.

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Building Residential Complex in Wassit

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By Nick, June 7, 2012 6:52 pm

Posted on 07 June 2012. Tags: Residential Complex, tenders, Wassit

General information

Type of advertisement / prequalification of the companies wishes to carry out the residential project in Wasit ( Al-azizia ) Governorate .

No. of Tender : 7/2012 .

Language : Arabic language .

Last closing date : ( 12:00 ) afternoon on Wednesday in 20 /6/2012

Chosen class

A/ governmental specialization companies that are interested to participate in tender to be entitled in participating with companies , Arabic and foreign institutions according to the item (3) from the article (15) from the law of general companies No. 22 year 1997 and it’s amendments.

B/ contracted companies that are classified as (excellent / construction) that are registered according to registry instructions and the classification of contracted companies and contractors No.3 year 2009 (original + copy).

C/ companies that are classified as (excellent / construction) that are interested to participate in tender with two companies or more also they can union in one contract jointly and severally registered in notary public as essential condition in participating and there is not allowed for any to retract or abandon from the contract of partnership in all stages of the project is beginning from starting of tender till the end of maintenance period.

D/ Arabic and foreign Companies that are interested to participate in tender according to the following:

- The company must to be specialized in construction jobs and the history of establishment not less than 5 years.

- Presenting certification of establishment company certified from granted side that is admitted in Iraq.

- Company must have a certified branch in Iraq in the Trade Ministry / registered companies or the office of commercial representation taking into consideration the rule of law No. 5 year 1989.

- If the company had an implementation businesses out of Iraq , it should present that documents and registered in Iraqi Foreign Ministry and in Iraqi embassy of that country ,that businesses were fulfilled according to application designed for that purpose.

Please click here to download tender’s details .

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Iraqi Business News | Building, Complex, Residential, Wassit

Computer worm that hit Iran oil terminals ‘is most complex yet’

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By Nick, May 28, 2012 9:00 pm

Computer worm that hit Iran oil terminals ‘is most complex yet’
By: Neal on: 28.05.2012 [20:53 ] (100 reads)

Computer worm that hit Iran oil terminals ‘is most complex yet’

A cyber-attack that targeted Iran’s oil ministry and main export terminal was caused by the most sophisticated computer worm yet developed, experts have warned.

The virus appears to have been directed primarily at a small number of organisations and individuals in Iran, the West Bank, Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates. This will inevitably raise suspicions that Israel or the US were involved in some way.

Analysts who have been decoding the computer worm, which is called W32.Flamer, have been unable to identify the source. But they say only a professional team working for several months could have been behind it.

The CrySys Laboratory, in Hungary, said: “The results of our technical analysis supports the hypothesis that the worm was developed by a government agency of a nation state with significant budget and effort, and it may be related to cyberwarfare activities.”It is certainly the most sophisticated malware we have encountered. Arguably, it is the most complex malware ever found.”

Orla Cox, a senior analyst at Symantec, the international computer security firm, said: “I would say that this is the most sophisticated threat we have ever seen.”

Symantec undertook a detailed analysis of the groundbreaking Stuxnet virus, which targeted Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities two years ago, sending some of their centrifuges spinning out of control. Cox said W32.Flamer appeared to be even more complex than Stuxnet, and that it was an incredibly clever, comprehensive “spying programme”.

“It is a backdoor worm that goes looking for very specific information. It scrapes a mass of information from any infected machines and then sends it, without the user having any idea what is going on. The amount of information it can send is huge.”

Symantec first started working on the code over the weekend after it was discovered by specialists at the Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security, at the University of Budapest.

Analysis now shows that the worm has been around, undetected, for at least two years, and experts are confident it was responsible for the disruption to Iran’s oil industry last month.

According to reports, the cyber-attack forced Iran to convene a “crisis committee” that ordered the disconnection of six of its main oil terminals from the internet, to stop the worm spreading.

One of these, on Kharg island, 16 miles off the north-western coast of Iran, processes 90% of the country’s crude oil exports.

The Iranian Students’ News Agency said that the virus had successfully erased information on hard disks at the oil ministry’s headquarters.

Though the oil ministry insisted that the worm had been contained and that no significant data had been erased, the likelihood is that W32.Flamer had been inside the network for many months and may already have completed its primary mission. Cox said the worm was designed to gather and send information covertly – unlike Stuxnet, which was built to identify and destroy equipment.

“Once the attacker has that level of access, then all bets are off,” she said. “Once the worm has infected a system, it would be possible to add new commands over time, to add an element of disruption.”

Though Symantec said it was impossible to say whether the team behind W32.Flamer was also behind Stuxnet. Cox said the two were similar in some ways, and shared some features.

“To the casual observer, the worm looks like any piece of software,” she said. “To get that level of sophistication would take a team of 10 several months. It’s very professional.”

The worm was able to take screenshots of users’ desktops, to spread via USB drives, and to disable security systems. It was also able to find security vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows to help it spread from network to network. As well as major networks, the worm appears to have infected personal computers being used at home, she said.

Symantec said it believed at least 100 organisations and individuals had been targeted by the worm, and that these were “primarily located in the Middle East”. The worm appeared to have transferred to Hungary, Russia, Austria and Hong Kong, though these may have been hit accidentally.

The use of so-called cyberwarfare was taken to new levels by Stuxnet, which disabled some of the centrifuges inside the Natanz enrichment plant, south-west of Tehran.

Though nobody has been able to say confidently who was responsible for building the virus, only certain countries are thought to have the necessary capability, or intent.

Israel and the US are thought to be world leaders in the development of such technology. Last year an investigation by the New York Times claimed Stuxnet was a joint US/Israeli operation designed to undermine Iran’s efforts to make a bomb of its own.

http://www.guardian.co.uk

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Computer worm that hit Iran oil terminals ‘is most complex yet’

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By Nick, May 28, 2012 6:17 pm

Computer worm that hit Iran oil terminals ‘is most complex yet’
By: Neal on: 28.05.2012 [20:53 ] (68 reads)