By Jim Kirwan
3-12-13

This hellish confrontation between the lawlessness of USI combined with the barbarity of Israel has been growing like a poisonous cancer for the last 65 years. It is way past time that we finally face the very real consequences which such tactics have earned us, over all the time we’ve been chasing this unthinkable nightmare, since long before the fraudulent creation of Israel.

The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse has been leading us since the beginning of ‘America’. Yet it is only now that all our crimes have finally caught up with us, to force the world to deal with us, on their terms not ours!

Russia has declared that since we have chosen to ignore their national-sovereignty along with so many other nations in our arrogant and illegal-assumptions: Thermo-Nuclear-War is again on the table: Internationally, unless Obama is absolutely-removed from power.

“Russia’s probable retaliation measures to the missile defense system also were on the agenda of talks which Speaker of the State Duma Sergey Naryshkin had with French members of parliament in Paris Naryshkin stressed that Russia needs “guarantees backed by objective technical parameters that this system will not be targeted against Russia…. When someone tells us in words that this system is not targeted against Russia but refuses to sign a legally binding agreement in deeds, this certainly raises doubts in us,” he said, insisting that security should be equal for all countries and indivisible. Naryshkin warned that Moscow “cannot twiddle its thumbs while its U.S. partners make decisions on deploying missile defense elements in Europe and putting them into practice…. But this is surely not our choice.” Naryshkin said Russia will have to take measures in response to the missile defense system’s deployment.

It’s common knowledge that, when it comes to protecting us from a nuclear launch by a major power such as Russia or China, missile defense has been found woefully lacking.

I don’t blame Russia for feeling boxed in and do you know what happens when you corner a bear? Yeah, I think you know. The game the west is playing is dangerous and is going to lead to World War 3. Not by accident, by design. ¬Mort” (1)

The world has basically only watched while USI has devastated nation after nation while totally disregarding the lawful sovereignty that we, (along with NATO, the UN and various other co-conspirators) have employed, to crush whatever constitutes the nations we target. USI has clearly become an outlaw-nation, a pariah nation that is savagely-preying upon the community of nations worldwide.

Here in the United States Obama’s Outlaws are going after “the right to keep and bear arms” as their international right to destroy the Constitution, the Bill of rights and the American Republic. Ironically this will do unto the USA exactly what Obama wants to do to the remaining international states in the world-wide Community of Nations.

If Americans cannot or will not stand up in their own defense of themselves, their way of life or for their own constitution—then we shall deserve what will directly come to each of us because of that failure. A DISARMED America will be nothing but the slave-state we already are, in everything except the name. Cowards do not deserve to live free, anymore than OUTLAWS deserve to profit from their global-crimes.

Ironically we have a unique opportunity now to overturn everything that has been haunting us since JFK was murdered. This is about smashing all those that have tried to play fast & furious, with our rights, under the U.S. Constitution.
Either we draw our own lines in the sand as individuals and order the government to stand-down; or we can say good-by to ‘life, liberty or the pursuit of anything worth having,’ and especially any personal joy—ever-again.

What might have begun here, for many, as a need to keep our right “to keep and bear arms” might well become the right of the citizens of this country to indict and evict the illegal-alien who has declared himself Dictator for Life. Obama has followed in the steps of Stalin or Hitler—if left unchecked he will slaughter more people for himself than both of those war-criminals combined.

We have a nation composed of hundreds of millions of mindless ignorant creatures that have no idea about politics law or this Republic. But there are others among us who know and understand what must be done before the world is allowed to descend into global-thermo-nuclear warfare.

On the dark side of my youth I was as ‘at home’ in the darkest of alleyways, as I was in unfamiliar courtrooms along the way. I was never a lawyer, but I grew to understand the law. I was never a gang member, but I fought gangs in spite of that. It’s a very different time today. Virtually all the unsaid rules have changed and changed again. Each of us must do whatever we can to alter whatever has been pre-planned for each and every one of us—if this place or the world is to continue to exist much longer.

The despot in the oval-office is a global-war-criminal and more. His aggressions backed up by our accession to presidential-decrees go all the way back to JFK. It is partly this that has created this global-insanity. USI and those of us that did not object are responsible for this outlaw at the helm of what was the United States. Unless Obama goes the world will be condemned to obliteration or worse. A partial obliteration of the planet will not support life any longer, much less human-societies. The choice is ours to make and we are almost totally out of time.

In barbarian-Israel Netanyahu is still unable to form his own pathetic-government. Hence he’s desperately in need of cover to disguise his weaknesses. His next move is possibly to hysterically launch air-strikes on Iran, which USI will then supposedly to be forced to support ¬ yet none of that is set in stone or sand.

All of this is being played out while the world is still poised on the precipice of a global-financial collapse that will exceed anything else the planet has ever experienced before. Israel now has its hundreds of nuclear missiles pointed directly at every major-capital in the world that it can reach. That’s the Israeli-Sword of Damocles with which it has threatened the entire planet since just after JFK’s assassination. The world must end that threat, as impossible as that might seem. However “key people” have always been able to make real differences in the outcomes which the world has faced through the darkness of time—and yet has so-far managed not to lose the entire human race…

There has never been so much riding on any series of issues which faces the planet—thanks to our failure to take responsibility for those we allowed to destroy the power and the base of this country, along with billions of innocent people the world over.

Ironically the entire agenda and the methodology for creating the global-police-state and the slave-state of America has been operating now for at least 65 years in the open. But the people of the United States have totally ignored this. This video prefaces each allegation with “What If?” But the truth is all of it has already happened, thousands of times over. (2)

Obama is our problem. If we care enough about survival we will “REMOVE OBAMA NOW” and join the rest of the world in dismantling this illegal war-machine and all that it has created.
kirwanstudios@sbcglobal.net

1) Russia Threatens USA With Nuclear Attack ¬ 10 min video
http://beforeitsnews.com/alternative/2013/03/russia-threatens-usa-with-nuclear-attack-video-2590814.html
2)Judge Napolitano – What If We Are Already Living Under A Dictatorship – 4 min 51 sec video
http://xrepublic.tv/node/1141

In Libya, U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three colleagues were murdered Tuesday. Earlier that day, protesters in Egypt stormed the U.S. embassy and tore down the American flag.

It was “the day the roof fell in,” proclaimed blogger and historian Walter Russell Mead. Barack Obama’s “efforts to reconcile the U.S. and moderate Islamism — in part by distancing the U.S. from Israel — have angered Israel without reducing Islamist bitterness against the United States.”

In other words, his Middle East policies are in shambles. His assumption that a president “who doesn’t look like other presidents” would endear America to Arabs has been proven unfounded.

So have other assumptions. Like the idea that Iran’s mullah regime would negotiate with us if we uttered soothing words and turned a cold eye on Iranian dissidents, as Obama did in June 2009.

And the idea that creating distance between the United States and Israel would lead to a settlement between Israelis and Palestinians.

Obama came to office believing that America had a lot to apologize for. For the “tension” between the U.S. and the Muslim world that “has been fed” by colonialism and the Cold War, as he said in his June 2009 “New Beginning” speech in Cairo.

There, he implicitly contrasted George W. Bush’s emphasis on universal human rights by admitting that “America does not presume to know what is best for everyone.”

Since the 9/11/12 attacks on America, Muslims have been protesting over much of the world, from Tunisia to Yemen to Bangladesh, and in some cases, have been assaulting our embassies.

The ostensible reason for the protests is a video produced by someone in the United States criticizing the Prophet Muhammad. But that’s obviously just a pretext, used by Islamist terrorist organizers to whip up frenzy in nations with large numbers of angry unemployed young men.

Unfortunately, some of our government officials have taken the complaints about the video seriously. Before the attack, the Cairo embassy issued a statement condemning “the continuing efforts by misguided individuals to hurt the religious feelings of Muslims.”

When Mitt Romney condemned that statement, he was widely criticized by mainstream media. But his judgment was confirmed when Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama ordered the statement taken down.

Even so, White House press secretary Jay Carney said the protests were directed at the video rather than the United States — wishful thinking. The Hollywood Reporter revealed that the FBI was sent to Los Angeles to track down the video maker. The Los Angeles Times reported that the State Department asked YouTube whether the offending video violated its terms of service.

As Fox News commentator Kirsten Powers wrote, “Our leaders shouldn’t let our enemies know that when they kill our people and attack our embassies that the U.S. government will act like a battered wife making excuses for her psychotic husband.”

It’s also disturbing that Obama, after his brief statement deploring the Benghazi murders (and not mentioning the attack on the Cairo embassy), immediately embarked on a four-hour plane ride to campaign in Las Vegas.

In an interview there with Telemundo, Obama said Egypt was neither an ally nor an enemy. Later, the State Department spokesman conceded that Egypt is officially an ally under a 1989 law.

That’s an unforced error for an incumbent president, one who has criticized his opponent’s lack of foreign policy experience.

But perhaps it’s not surprising. American Enterprise Institute’s Marc Thiessen revealed last week that Obama has skipped more than half of his daily intelligence briefings. He reads the reports instead. His last in-person briefing before 9/11/12 was on Sept. 5.

It’s not clear why security efforts failed in Benghazi and the Libyan government’s assurances that it will protect our diplomats in the future seems sincere.

And Obama did find time for a reportedly “tense” phone conversation with Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi, who then made a public statement denouncing the attacks. But on the phone, Morsi reportedly asked Obama to “put an end to such behavior” — i.e., suppress the video. Did the president explain that we have a First Amendment that prevents government from doing such things?

Under settled principles of international law, attacks on diplomats by, or permitted by, governments can be considered acts of war. The threat of such attacks deserves a more stern response than a campaign trip to Vegas, a misstatement of settled policy and skipped intelligence briefings.

By Michael Barone
Human Events

Published: 13 September, 2012, 18:49

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has addressed a message to US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton condemning the death of the US Ambassador to Libya Chris Stevens. He also called for a change of tact in the fight against terrorism.

­”I am shocked by the tragic death of Ambassador Chris Stevens and his colleagues,” the message began. “Please convey our words of sincere sympathy to the families and friends of the deceased.”

He also took the opportunity to appeal for better coordinated anti-terrorism efforts between the two countries.

“We strongly condemn this crime that once again confirms the need for the joint efforts of our countries, as well as the global community in combating the evil of terrorism in all its manifestations,” Lavrov wrote in his message, which appeared on the Foreign Ministry’s website.

Violent protests erupted on Tuesday in the Libyan city of Benghazi following the release of a US film entitled “Innocence of Muslims,” which many Muslim groups condemned as blasphemous.

The US Embassy became the rallying point of a highly charged protest that eventually saw militant Islamists targeting the American complex with rocket fire. Ambassador Chris Stevens, press officer Sean Smith and two marines accompanying the ambassador were killed in the attack.

Thus, the so-called Arab Spring has come full circle: newly liberated Libya, which just passed through a brutal civil war that pitted pro-Gaddafi forces against a Western-backed opposition, is responsible for the death of an envoy whose country contributed to the Libyan ‘liberation.’

In a recent interview with RT, President Vladimir Putin touched upon the issue of America’s tendency to interfere militarily in countries that are experiencing internal strife and the consequences such a strategy may have.

Mentioning the upheaval gripping the Arab world and the West’s determination to intervene in the internal strife, Putin asked: “Would you say that order and prosperity has been ensured in these countries?”

Concerning the situation in Libya, Putin was even less sanguine.

“In Libya, there are armed clashes raging between the various tribes, and I won’t even mention how this country experienced regime change,” the Russian leader said.

Putin stressed, however, that the violence that we are now witnessing has its roots back in 1979 when the United States trained rebels to fight against Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Those fighters, under the leadership of Osama bin Laden, went on to become al-Qaeda, the terrorist organization that Russia warned made up part of the Libyan opposition.

Ekaterina Kuznetsova, from the Center for Post-Industrial Studies, told RT that the violence in Libya and elsewhere is a sign that the Americans failed to fully consider the “the consequences, of what would follow from their intervention (in Libya).”

“By now it is obvious that terrorist activity has drastically increased after the Gaddafi regime was removed by terrorist groups,” Kuznetsova said. “This is often the case with totalitarian regimes and the vacuum that remains after they’ve been eliminated.”

The killing of the US diplomats basically shows two things: that there are profound problems with security and state order in Libya, and that the US position there is not as strong as they may have thought it was, she added.

According to Vyacheslav Naumkin, Director of the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Oriental Studies, radical Islamists are strengthening their positions, which means the United States failed to achieve its goals by intervening in the Arab Spring.

“The current developments strengthen the position of radical Islamists in the Middle East,” Naumkin said. “There will be no universal war against the US, but it is a crisis, and there will be a lot more such crises in the future.”

Naumkin blames US foreign policy in Afghanistan, as well as the unsettled Arab-Israeli conflict, for much of Washington’s current problems.

“Obviously, the US failed to take control of relations with the Islamic world and to bring them to a new level,” he said. “The unsettled Arab-Israeli conflict and US actions in Afghanistan promote the growth of anti-American feelings.”

http://rt.com/politics/russia-us-libya-ambassador-stevens-046/

Published: 13 September, 2012, 18:49

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has addressed a message to US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton condemning the death of the US Ambassador to Libya Chris Stevens. He also called for a change of tact in the fight against terrorism.

­”I am shocked by the tragic death of Ambassador Chris Stevens and his colleagues,” the message began. “Please convey our words of sincere sympathy to the families and friends of the deceased.”

He also took the opportunity to appeal for better coordinated anti-terrorism efforts between the two countries.

“We strongly condemn this crime that once again confirms the need for the joint efforts of our countries, as well as the global community in combating the evil of terrorism in all its manifestations,” Lavrov wrote in his message, which appeared on the Foreign Ministry’s website.

Violent protests erupted on Tuesday in the Libyan city of Benghazi following the release of a US film entitled “Innocence of Muslims,” which many Muslim groups condemned as blasphemous.

The US Embassy became the rallying point of a highly charged protest that eventually saw militant Islamists targeting the American complex with rocket fire. Ambassador Chris Stevens, press officer Sean Smith and two marines accompanying the ambassador were killed in the attack.

Thus, the so-called Arab Spring has come full circle: newly liberated Libya, which just passed through a brutal civil war that pitted pro-Gaddafi forces against a Western-backed opposition, is responsible for the death of an envoy whose country contributed to the Libyan ‘liberation.’

In a recent interview with RT, President Vladimir Putin touched upon the issue of America’s tendency to interfere militarily in countries that are experiencing internal strife and the consequences such a strategy may have.

Mentioning the upheaval gripping the Arab world and the West’s determination to intervene in the internal strife, Putin asked: “Would you say that order and prosperity has been ensured in these countries?”

Concerning the situation in Libya, Putin was even less sanguine.

“In Libya, there are armed clashes raging between the various tribes, and I won’t even mention how this country experienced regime change,” the Russian leader said.

Putin stressed, however, that the violence that we are now witnessing has its roots back in 1979 when the United States trained rebels to fight against Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Those fighters, under the leadership of Osama bin Laden, went on to become al-Qaeda, the terrorist organization that Russia warned made up part of the Libyan opposition.

Ekaterina Kuznetsova, from the Center for Post-Industrial Studies, told RT that the violence in Libya and elsewhere is a sign that the Americans failed to fully consider the “the consequences, of what would follow from their intervention (in Libya).”

“By now it is obvious that terrorist activity has drastically increased after the Gaddafi regime was removed by terrorist groups,” Kuznetsova said. “This is often the case with totalitarian regimes and the vacuum that remains after they’ve been eliminated.”

The killing of the US diplomats basically shows two things: that there are profound problems with security and state order in Libya, and that the US position there is not as strong as they may have thought it was, she added.

According to Vyacheslav Naumkin, Director of the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Oriental Studies, radical Islamists are strengthening their positions, which means the United States failed to achieve its goals by intervening in the Arab Spring.

“The current developments strengthen the position of radical Islamists in the Middle East,” Naumkin said. “There will be no universal war against the US, but it is a crisis, and there will be a lot more such crises in the future.”

Naumkin blames US foreign policy in Afghanistan, as well as the unsettled Arab-Israeli conflict, for much of Washington’s current problems.

“Obviously, the US failed to take control of relations with the Islamic world and to bring them to a new level,” he said. “The unsettled Arab-Israeli conflict and US actions in Afghanistan promote the growth of anti-American feelings.”

http://rt.com/politics/russia-us-libya-ambassador-stevens-046/

July 24, 2012 | 0900 GMT

Stratfor

By George Friedman

We have entered the endgame in Syria. That doesn’t mean that we have reached the end by any means, but it does mean that the precondition has been met for the fall of the regime of Syrian President Bashar al Assad. We have argued that so long as the military and security apparatus remain intact and effective, the regime could endure. Although they continue to function, neither appears intact any longer; their control of key areas such as Damascus and Aleppo is in doubt, and the reliability of their personnel, given defections, is no longer certain. We had thought that there was a reasonable chance of the al Assad regime surviving completely. That is no longer the case. At a certain point — in our view, after the defection of a Syrian pilot June 21 and then the defection of the Tlass clan — key members of the regime began to recalculate the probability of survival and their interests. The regime has not unraveled, but it is unraveling.

The speculation over al Assad’s whereabouts and heavy fighting in Damascus is simply part of the regime’s problems. Rumors, whether true or not, create uncertainty that the regime cannot afford right now. The outcome is unclear. On the one hand, a new regime might emerge that could exercise control. On the other hand, Syria could collapse into a Lebanon situation in which it disintegrates into regions held by various factions, with no effective central government.

The Russian and Chinese Strategy

The geopolitical picture is somewhat clearer than the internal political picture. Whatever else happens, it is unlikely that al Assad will be able to return to unchallenged rule. The United States, France and other European countries have opposed his regime. Russia, China and Iran have supported it, each for different reasons. The Russians opposed the West’s calls to intervene, which were grounded on human rights concerns, fearing that the proposed intervention was simply subterfuge meant to extend Western power and that it would be used against them. The Chinese also supported the Syrians, in part for these same reasons. Both Moscow and Beijing hoped to avoid legitimizing Western pressure based on human rights considerations — something they had each faced at one time or another. In addition, Russia and China wanted the United States in particular focused on the Middle East rather than on them. They would not have minded a military intervention that would have bogged down the United States, but the United States declined to give that to them.

But the Russian and Chinese game was subtler than that. It focused on Iran. As we have argued, if the al Assad regime were to survive and were to be isolated from the West, it would be primarily dependent on Iran, its main patron. Iran had supplied trainers, special operations troops, supplies and money to sustain the regime. For Iran, the events in Syria represented a tremendous opportunity. Iran already held a powerful position in Iraq, not quite dominating it but heavily influencing it. If the al Assad regime survived and had Iranian support to thank for its survival, Syria would become even more dependent on Iran than was Iraq. This would shore up the Iranian position in Iraq, but more important, it would have created an Iranian sphere of influence stretching from western Afghanistan to Lebanon, where Hezbollah is an Iranian ally.

The Russians and Chinese clearly understood that if this had happened, the United States would have had an intense interest in undermining the Iranian sphere of influence — and would have had to devote massive resources to doing so. Russia and China benefitted greatly in the post-9/11 world, when the United States was obsessed with the Islamic world and had little interest or resources to devote to China and Russia. With the end of the Afghanistan war looming, this respite seemed likely to end. Underwriting Iranian hegemony over a region that would inevitably draw the United States’ attention was a low-cost, high-return strategy.

The Chinese primarily provided political cover, keeping the Russians from having to operate alone diplomatically. They devoted no resources to the Syrian conflict but did continue to oppose sanctions against Iran and provided trade opportunities for Iran. The Russians made a much larger commitment, providing material and political support to the al Assad regime.

It seems the Russians began calculating the end for the regime some time ago. Russia continued to deliver ammunition and other supplies to Syria but pulled back on a delivery of helicopters. Several attempts to deliver the helicopters “failed” when British insurers of the ship pulled coverage. That was the reason the Russians gave for not delivering the helicopters, but obviously the Russians could have insured the ship themselves. They were backing off from supporting al Assad, their intelligence indicating trouble in Damascus. In the last few days the Russians have moved to the point where they had their ambassador to France suggest that the time had come for al Assad to leave — then, of course, he denied having made the statement.

A Strategic Blow to Iran

As the Russians withdraw support, Iran is now left extremely exposed. There had been a sense of inevitability in Iran’s rise in the region, particularly in the Arabian Peninsula. The decline of al Assad’s regime is a strategic blow to the Iranians in two ways. First, the wide-reaching sphere of influence they were creating clearly won’t happen now. Second, Iran will rapidly move from being an ascendant power to a power on the defensive.

The place where this will become most apparent is in Iraq. For Iran, Iraq represents a fundamental national security interest. Having fought a bloody war with Iraq in the 1980s, the Iranians have an overriding interest in assuring that Iraq remains at least neutral and preferably pro-Iranian. While Iran was ascendant, Iraqi politicians felt that they had to be accommodating. However, in the same way that Syrian generals had to recalculate their positions, Iraqi politicians have to do the same. With sanctions — whatever their effectiveness — being imposed on Iran, and with Iran’s position in Syria unraveling, the psychology in Iraq might change.

This is particularly the case because of intensifying Turkish interest in Iraq. In recent days the Turks have announced plans for pipelines in Iraq to oil fields in the south and in the north. Turkish economic activity is intensifying. Turkey is the only regional power that can challenge Iran militarily. It uses that power against the Kurds in Iraq. But more to the point, if a country builds a pipeline, it must ensure access to it, either politically or militarily. Turkey does not want to militarily involve itself in Iraq, but it does want political influence to guarantee its interests. Thus, just as the Iranians are in retreat, the Turks have an interest in, if not supplanting them, certainly supplementing them.

The pressure on Iran is now intense, and it will be interesting to see the political consequences. There was consensus on the Syrian strategy, but with failure of the strategy, that consensus dissolves. This will have an impact inside of Iran, possibly even more than the sanctions. Governments have trouble managing reversals.

Other Consequences

From the American point of view, al Assad’s decline opens two opportunities. First, its policy of no direct military intervention but unremitting political and, to a lesser extent, economic pressure appears to be working in this instance. More precisely, even if it had no effect, it will appear that it did, which will enhance the ability of the United States to influence events in other countries without actually having to intervene.

Second, the current situation opens the door for a genuine balance of power in the region that does not require constant American intervention. One of the consequences of the events in Syria is that Turkey has had to reconsider its policy toward countries on its periphery. In the case of Iraq, Turkey has an interest in suppressing the Kurdistan Workers’ Party militants who have taken refuge there and defending oil and other economic interests. Turkey’s strategy is moving from avoiding all confrontations to avoiding major military commitments while pursuing its political interests. In the end, that means that Turkey will begin moving into a position of balancing Iran for its own interests in Iraq.

This relieves the United States of the burden of containing Iran. We continue to regard the Iranian sphere of influence as a greater threat to American and regional interests than Iran’s nuclear program. The decline of al Assad solves the major problem. It also increases the sense of vulnerability in Iran. Depending on how close they are to creating a deliverable nuclear weapon — and our view is that they are not close — the Iranians may feel it necessary to moderate their position.

A major loser in this is Israel. Israel had maintained a clear understanding with the al Assad regime. If the al Assad regime restrained Hezbollah, Israel would have no objection to al Assad’s dominating Lebanon. That agreement has frayed since the United States pushed al Assad’s influence out of Lebanon in 2006. Nevertheless, the Israelis preferred al Assad to the Sunnis — until it appeared that the Iranians would dominate Syria. But the possibility of either an Islamist regime in Damascus or, more likely, Lebanese-style instability cannot please the Israelis. They are already experiencing jihadist threats in Sinai. The idea of having similar problems in Syria, where the other side of the border is the Galilee rather than the Negev, must make them nervous.

But perhaps the most important losers will be Russia and China. Russia, like Iran, has suffered a significant setback in its foreign policy that will have psychological consequences. The situation in Syria has halted the foreign-policy momentum the Russians had built up. But more important, the Russian and Chinese hope has been that the United States would continue to treat them as secondary issues while it focused on the Middle East. The decline of al Assad and the resulting dynamic in the region increases the possibility that the United States can disengage from the region. This is not something the Russians or Chinese want, but in the end, they did not have the power to create the outcome in Syria that they had wanted.

The strategy of the dominant power is to encourage a balance of power that contains threats without requiring direct intervention. This was the British strategy, but it has not been one that the United States has managed well. After the jihadist wars, there is a maturation under way in U.S. strategy. That means allowing the intrinsic dynamic in the region to work, intervening only as the final recourse. The events in Syria appear to be simply about the survival of the al Assad regime. But they have far greater significance in terms of limiting Iranian power, creating a local balance of power and freeing the United States to focus on global issues, including Russia and China.
.

Read more: Consequences of the Fall of the Syrian Regime | Stratfor

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/consequences-fall-syrian-regime?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20120724&utm_term=gweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=6fe666e40559498cbe84b4fefa43af4a

July 24, 2012 | 0900 GMT

Stratfor

By George Friedman

We have entered the endgame in Syria. That doesn’t mean that we have reached the end by any means, but it does mean that the precondition has been met for the fall of the regime of Syrian President Bashar al Assad. We have argued that so long as the military and security apparatus remain intact and effective, the regime could endure. Although they continue to function, neither appears intact any longer; their control of key areas such as Damascus and Aleppo is in doubt, and the reliability of their personnel, given defections, is no longer certain. We had thought that there was a reasonable chance of the al Assad regime surviving completely. That is no longer the case. At a certain point — in our view, after the defection of a Syrian pilot June 21 and then the defection of the Tlass clan — key members of the regime began to recalculate the probability of survival and their interests. The regime has not unraveled, but it is unraveling.

The speculation over al Assad’s whereabouts and heavy fighting in Damascus is simply part of the regime’s problems. Rumors, whether true or not, create uncertainty that the regime cannot afford right now. The outcome is unclear. On the one hand, a new regime might emerge that could exercise control. On the other hand, Syria could collapse into a Lebanon situation in which it disintegrates into regions held by various factions, with no effective central government.

The Russian and Chinese Strategy

The geopolitical picture is somewhat clearer than the internal political picture. Whatever else happens, it is unlikely that al Assad will be able to return to unchallenged rule. The United States, France and other European countries have opposed his regime. Russia, China and Iran have supported it, each for different reasons. The Russians opposed the West’s calls to intervene, which were grounded on human rights concerns, fearing that the proposed intervention was simply subterfuge meant to extend Western power and that it would be used against them. The Chinese also supported the Syrians, in part for these same reasons. Both Moscow and Beijing hoped to avoid legitimizing Western pressure based on human rights considerations — something they had each faced at one time or another. In addition, Russia and China wanted the United States in particular focused on the Middle East rather than on them. They would not have minded a military intervention that would have bogged down the United States, but the United States declined to give that to them.

But the Russian and Chinese game was subtler than that. It focused on Iran. As we have argued, if the al Assad regime were to survive and were to be isolated from the West, it would be primarily dependent on Iran, its main patron. Iran had supplied trainers, special operations troops, supplies and money to sustain the regime. For Iran, the events in Syria represented a tremendous opportunity. Iran already held a powerful position in Iraq, not quite dominating it but heavily influencing it. If the al Assad regime survived and had Iranian support to thank for its survival, Syria would become even more dependent on Iran than was Iraq. This would shore up the Iranian position in Iraq, but more important, it would have created an Iranian sphere of influence stretching from western Afghanistan to Lebanon, where Hezbollah is an Iranian ally.

The Russians and Chinese clearly understood that if this had happened, the United States would have had an intense interest in undermining the Iranian sphere of influence — and would have had to devote massive resources to doing so. Russia and China benefitted greatly in the post-9/11 world, when the United States was obsessed with the Islamic world and had little interest or resources to devote to China and Russia. With the end of the Afghanistan war looming, this respite seemed likely to end. Underwriting Iranian hegemony over a region that would inevitably draw the United States’ attention was a low-cost, high-return strategy.

The Chinese primarily provided political cover, keeping the Russians from having to operate alone diplomatically. They devoted no resources to the Syrian conflict but did continue to oppose sanctions against Iran and provided trade opportunities for Iran. The Russians made a much larger commitment, providing material and political support to the al Assad regime.

It seems the Russians began calculating the end for the regime some time ago. Russia continued to deliver ammunition and other supplies to Syria but pulled back on a delivery of helicopters. Several attempts to deliver the helicopters “failed” when British insurers of the ship pulled coverage. That was the reason the Russians gave for not delivering the helicopters, but obviously the Russians could have insured the ship themselves. They were backing off from supporting al Assad, their intelligence indicating trouble in Damascus. In the last few days the Russians have moved to the point where they had their ambassador to France suggest that the time had come for al Assad to leave — then, of course, he denied having made the statement.

A Strategic Blow to Iran

As the Russians withdraw support, Iran is now left extremely exposed. There had been a sense of inevitability in Iran’s rise in the region, particularly in the Arabian Peninsula. The decline of al Assad’s regime is a strategic blow to the Iranians in two ways. First, the wide-reaching sphere of influence they were creating clearly won’t happen now. Second, Iran will rapidly move from being an ascendant power to a power on the defensive.

The place where this will become most apparent is in Iraq. For Iran, Iraq represents a fundamental national security interest. Having fought a bloody war with Iraq in the 1980s, the Iranians have an overriding interest in assuring that Iraq remains at least neutral and preferably pro-Iranian. While Iran was ascendant, Iraqi politicians felt that they had to be accommodating. However, in the same way that Syrian generals had to recalculate their positions, Iraqi politicians have to do the same. With sanctions — whatever their effectiveness — being imposed on Iran, and with Iran’s position in Syria unraveling, the psychology in Iraq might change.

This is particularly the case because of intensifying Turkish interest in Iraq. In recent days the Turks have announced plans for pipelines in Iraq to oil fields in the south and in the north. Turkish economic activity is intensifying. Turkey is the only regional power that can challenge Iran militarily. It uses that power against the Kurds in Iraq. But more to the point, if a country builds a pipeline, it must ensure access to it, either politically or militarily. Turkey does not want to militarily involve itself in Iraq, but it does want political influence to guarantee its interests. Thus, just as the Iranians are in retreat, the Turks have an interest in, if not supplanting them, certainly supplementing them.

The pressure on Iran is now intense, and it will be interesting to see the political consequences. There was consensus on the Syrian strategy, but with failure of the strategy, that consensus dissolves. This will have an impact inside of Iran, possibly even more than the sanctions. Governments have trouble managing reversals.

Other Consequences

From the American point of view, al Assad’s decline opens two opportunities. First, its policy of no direct military intervention but unremitting political and, to a lesser extent, economic pressure appears to be working in this instance. More precisely, even if it had no effect, it will appear that it did, which will enhance the ability of the United States to influence events in other countries without actually having to intervene.

Second, the current situation opens the door for a genuine balance of power in the region that does not require constant American intervention. One of the consequences of the events in Syria is that Turkey has had to reconsider its policy toward countries on its periphery. In the case of Iraq, Turkey has an interest in suppressing the Kurdistan Workers’ Party militants who have taken refuge there and defending oil and other economic interests. Turkey’s strategy is moving from avoiding all confrontations to avoiding major military commitments while pursuing its political interests. In the end, that means that Turkey will begin moving into a position of balancing Iran for its own interests in Iraq.

This relieves the United States of the burden of containing Iran. We continue to regard the Iranian sphere of influence as a greater threat to American and regional interests than Iran’s nuclear program. The decline of al Assad solves the major problem. It also increases the sense of vulnerability in Iran. Depending on how close they are to creating a deliverable nuclear weapon — and our view is that they are not close — the Iranians may feel it necessary to moderate their position.

A major loser in this is Israel. Israel had maintained a clear understanding with the al Assad regime. If the al Assad regime restrained Hezbollah, Israel would have no objection to al Assad’s dominating Lebanon. That agreement has frayed since the United States pushed al Assad’s influence out of Lebanon in 2006. Nevertheless, the Israelis preferred al Assad to the Sunnis — until it appeared that the Iranians would dominate Syria. But the possibility of either an Islamist regime in Damascus or, more likely, Lebanese-style instability cannot please the Israelis. They are already experiencing jihadist threats in Sinai. The idea of having similar problems in Syria, where the other side of the border is the Galilee rather than the Negev, must make them nervous.

But perhaps the most important losers will be Russia and China. Russia, like Iran, has suffered a significant setback in its foreign policy that will have psychological consequences. The situation in Syria has halted the foreign-policy momentum the Russians had built up. But more important, the Russian and Chinese hope has been that the United States would continue to treat them as secondary issues while it focused on the Middle East. The decline of al Assad and the resulting dynamic in the region increases the possibility that the United States can disengage from the region. This is not something the Russians or Chinese want, but in the end, they did not have the power to create the outcome in Syria that they had wanted.

The strategy of the dominant power is to encourage a balance of power that contains threats without requiring direct intervention. This was the British strategy, but it has not been one that the United States has managed well. After the jihadist wars, there is a maturation under way in U.S. strategy. That means allowing the intrinsic dynamic in the region to work, intervening only as the final recourse. The events in Syria appear to be simply about the survival of the al Assad regime. But they have far greater significance in terms of limiting Iranian power, creating a local balance of power and freeing the United States to focus on global issues, including Russia and China.
.

Read more: Consequences of the Fall of the Syrian Regime | Stratfor

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/consequences-fall-syrian-regime?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20120724&utm_term=gweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=6fe666e40559498cbe84b4fefa43af4a

July 24, 2012 | 0900 GMT

Stratfor

By George Friedman

We have entered the endgame in Syria. That doesn’t mean that we have reached the end by any means, but it does mean that the precondition has been met for the fall of the regime of Syrian President Bashar al Assad. We have argued that so long as the military and security apparatus remain intact and effective, the regime could endure. Although they continue to function, neither appears intact any longer; their control of key areas such as Damascus and Aleppo is in doubt, and the reliability of their personnel, given defections, is no longer certain. We had thought that there was a reasonable chance of the al Assad regime surviving completely. That is no longer the case. At a certain point — in our view, after the defection of a Syrian pilot June 21 and then the defection of the Tlass clan — key members of the regime began to recalculate the probability of survival and their interests. The regime has not unraveled, but it is unraveling.

The speculation over al Assad’s whereabouts and heavy fighting in Damascus is simply part of the regime’s problems. Rumors, whether true or not, create uncertainty that the regime cannot afford right now. The outcome is unclear. On the one hand, a new regime might emerge that could exercise control. On the other hand, Syria could collapse into a Lebanon situation in which it disintegrates into regions held by various factions, with no effective central government.

The Russian and Chinese Strategy

The geopolitical picture is somewhat clearer than the internal political picture. Whatever else happens, it is unlikely that al Assad will be able to return to unchallenged rule. The United States, France and other European countries have opposed his regime. Russia, China and Iran have supported it, each for different reasons. The Russians opposed the West’s calls to intervene, which were grounded on human rights concerns, fearing that the proposed intervention was simply subterfuge meant to extend Western power and that it would be used against them. The Chinese also supported the Syrians, in part for these same reasons. Both Moscow and Beijing hoped to avoid legitimizing Western pressure based on human rights considerations — something they had each faced at one time or another. In addition, Russia and China wanted the United States in particular focused on the Middle East rather than on them. They would not have minded a military intervention that would have bogged down the United States, but the United States declined to give that to them.

But the Russian and Chinese game was subtler than that. It focused on Iran. As we have argued, if the al Assad regime were to survive and were to be isolated from the West, it would be primarily dependent on Iran, its main patron. Iran had supplied trainers, special operations troops, supplies and money to sustain the regime. For Iran, the events in Syria represented a tremendous opportunity. Iran already held a powerful position in Iraq, not quite dominating it but heavily influencing it. If the al Assad regime survived and had Iranian support to thank for its survival, Syria would become even more dependent on Iran than was Iraq. This would shore up the Iranian position in Iraq, but more important, it would have created an Iranian sphere of influence stretching from western Afghanistan to Lebanon, where Hezbollah is an Iranian ally.

The Russians and Chinese clearly understood that if this had happened, the United States would have had an intense interest in undermining the Iranian sphere of influence — and would have had to devote massive resources to doing so. Russia and China benefitted greatly in the post-9/11 world, when the United States was obsessed with the Islamic world and had little interest or resources to devote to China and Russia. With the end of the Afghanistan war looming, this respite seemed likely to end. Underwriting Iranian hegemony over a region that would inevitably draw the United States’ attention was a low-cost, high-return strategy.

The Chinese primarily provided political cover, keeping the Russians from having to operate alone diplomatically. They devoted no resources to the Syrian conflict but did continue to oppose sanctions against Iran and provided trade opportunities for Iran. The Russians made a much larger commitment, providing material and political support to the al Assad regime.

It seems the Russians began calculating the end for the regime some time ago. Russia continued to deliver ammunition and other supplies to Syria but pulled back on a delivery of helicopters. Several attempts to deliver the helicopters “failed” when British insurers of the ship pulled coverage. That was the reason the Russians gave for not delivering the helicopters, but obviously the Russians could have insured the ship themselves. They were backing off from supporting al Assad, their intelligence indicating trouble in Damascus. In the last few days the Russians have moved to the point where they had their ambassador to France suggest that the time had come for al Assad to leave — then, of course, he denied having made the statement.

A Strategic Blow to Iran

As the Russians withdraw support, Iran is now left extremely exposed. There had been a sense of inevitability in Iran’s rise in the region, particularly in the Arabian Peninsula. The decline of al Assad’s regime is a strategic blow to the Iranians in two ways. First, the wide-reaching sphere of influence they were creating clearly won’t happen now. Second, Iran will rapidly move from being an ascendant power to a power on the defensive.

The place where this will become most apparent is in Iraq. For Iran, Iraq represents a fundamental national security interest. Having fought a bloody war with Iraq in the 1980s, the Iranians have an overriding interest in assuring that Iraq remains at least neutral and preferably pro-Iranian. While Iran was ascendant, Iraqi politicians felt that they had to be accommodating. However, in the same way that Syrian generals had to recalculate their positions, Iraqi politicians have to do the same. With sanctions — whatever their effectiveness — being imposed on Iran, and with Iran’s position in Syria unraveling, the psychology in Iraq might change.

This is particularly the case because of intensifying Turkish interest in Iraq. In recent days the Turks have announced plans for pipelines in Iraq to oil fields in the south and in the north. Turkish economic activity is intensifying. Turkey is the only regional power that can challenge Iran militarily. It uses that power against the Kurds in Iraq. But more to the point, if a country builds a pipeline, it must ensure access to it, either politically or militarily. Turkey does not want to militarily involve itself in Iraq, but it does want political influence to guarantee its interests. Thus, just as the Iranians are in retreat, the Turks have an interest in, if not supplanting them, certainly supplementing them.

The pressure on Iran is now intense, and it will be interesting to see the political consequences. There was consensus on the Syrian strategy, but with failure of the strategy, that consensus dissolves. This will have an impact inside of Iran, possibly even more than the sanctions. Governments have trouble managing reversals.

Other Consequences

From the American point of view, al Assad’s decline opens two opportunities. First, its policy of no direct military intervention but unremitting political and, to a lesser extent, economic pressure appears to be working in this instance. More precisely, even if it had no effect, it will appear that it did, which will enhance the ability of the United States to influence events in other countries without actually having to intervene.

Second, the current situation opens the door for a genuine balance of power in the region that does not require constant American intervention. One of the consequences of the events in Syria is that Turkey has had to reconsider its policy toward countries on its periphery. In the case of Iraq, Turkey has an interest in suppressing the Kurdistan Workers’ Party militants who have taken refuge there and defending oil and other economic interests. Turkey’s strategy is moving from avoiding all confrontations to avoiding major military commitments while pursuing its political interests. In the end, that means that Turkey will begin moving into a position of balancing Iran for its own interests in Iraq.

This relieves the United States of the burden of containing Iran. We continue to regard the Iranian sphere of influence as a greater threat to American and regional interests than Iran’s nuclear program. The decline of al Assad solves the major problem. It also increases the sense of vulnerability in Iran. Depending on how close they are to creating a deliverable nuclear weapon — and our view is that they are not close — the Iranians may feel it necessary to moderate their position.

A major loser in this is Israel. Israel had maintained a clear understanding with the al Assad regime. If the al Assad regime restrained Hezbollah, Israel would have no objection to al Assad’s dominating Lebanon. That agreement has frayed since the United States pushed al Assad’s influence out of Lebanon in 2006. Nevertheless, the Israelis preferred al Assad to the Sunnis — until it appeared that the Iranians would dominate Syria. But the possibility of either an Islamist regime in Damascus or, more likely, Lebanese-style instability cannot please the Israelis. They are already experiencing jihadist threats in Sinai. The idea of having similar problems in Syria, where the other side of the border is the Galilee rather than the Negev, must make them nervous.

But perhaps the most important losers will be Russia and China. Russia, like Iran, has suffered a significant setback in its foreign policy that will have psychological consequences. The situation in Syria has halted the foreign-policy momentum the Russians had built up. But more important, the Russian and Chinese hope has been that the United States would continue to treat them as secondary issues while it focused on the Middle East. The decline of al Assad and the resulting dynamic in the region increases the possibility that the United States can disengage from the region. This is not something the Russians or Chinese want, but in the end, they did not have the power to create the outcome in Syria that they had wanted.

The strategy of the dominant power is to encourage a balance of power that contains threats without requiring direct intervention. This was the British strategy, but it has not been one that the United States has managed well. After the jihadist wars, there is a maturation under way in U.S. strategy. That means allowing the intrinsic dynamic in the region to work, intervening only as the final recourse. The events in Syria appear to be simply about the survival of the al Assad regime. But they have far greater significance in terms of limiting Iranian power, creating a local balance of power and freeing the United States to focus on global issues, including Russia and China.
.

Read more: Consequences of the Fall of the Syrian Regime | Stratfor

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/consequences-fall-syrian-regime?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20120724&utm_term=gweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=6fe666e40559498cbe84b4fefa43af4a

Baghdad — Iraq has warned of Syrian crisis’ consequences, pointing to a potential spillover effect for other countries in the Middle East.

“It is a main concern for us that the crisis might spill over into the neighbouring countries, as no country is immune to such a spillover because of the composition of the societies in these countries…,” Xinhua quoted Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari as saying.

He was speaking to reporters Saturday at a news conference held jointly with visiting Swedish, Bulgarian and Polish foreign ministers.

Zebari said the shooting down of a Turkish warplane over the eastern Mediterranean Friday was a “serious escalation” that might have a worse impact on the region than on Syria itself.

“Iraq is concerned about the Syrian crisis, and its role cannot be bypassed in any decision aimed at solving the crisis. Any regional, Arab or international attempt to jump over its role will not succeed,” he said.

The minister, however, reiterated his country’s long-standing take on the Syrian issue, namely “supporting the political and democratic change in Syria,” as Iraq has always been supportive in the Syrian people’s cause of gaining democracy and freedom.

Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government has maintained close ties with Syria, whose President Bashar al-Assad is a member of the Alawite sect, an offshoot of Shiite Islam.

http://india.nydailynews.com